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SEXUAL SPEECH AND THE STATE: 
PUTTING PORNOGRAPHY IN ITS 
PLACE 
MARY C. DUNLAP* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
People in the United States in the 1980's have experienced 
dramatic calls for restrictions upon certain types of sexually ex-
plicit speech, labeled "pornography," by a worrisome if histori-
cally unremarkable l coalition of allegedly radical feminists and 
obviously right-wing moralists. In 1984 and 1985, this call 
crescendoed legally, in at least two important and widely ob-
served fora. In conjunction with its foray into a United States 
District Court in Indiana, and in a Department of Justice com-
mission on pornography, a nationwide "anti-pornography" cam-
paign experienced considerable media exposure and public 
discussion. 
In the litigation of American Booksellers Association Inc. v. 
Hudnut,2 an Indianapolis municipal ordinance that purported to 
define "pornography"3, and to declare it a civilly actionable form 
* B.A., 1968, J.D., 1971, University of California, Berkeley. Ms. Dunlap is a co-
founder of Equal Rights Advocates, Inc., San Francisco, Ca., where she taught and prac-
ticed law from 1973-1978. Ms. Dunlap has been a sole practitoner of law, emphasizing 
civil rights cases, in San Francisco, from about 1980 to date. Ms. Dunlap also has taught 
"Indivudual Human Rights" at Golden Gate University Law School for several years, 
stating in 1984. 
1. Dubois, MacKinnon, Dunlap et al., Feminist Discourse, Moral Values and the 
Law - A Conversation 34 BUFFALO L. REV. 67 (1985)("The late nineteenth century 
women's movement also began a campaign against obscene literature. The Women's 
Christian Temperance Union, which was the largest late-nineteenth century feminist or-
ganization, had a department of obscene literature. It gave political support to Anthony 
Comstock (footnote omitted) . . . the author of the basic obscenity laws in the United 
States.") See also, Walkowitz, The Politics of Prostitution, 6 SIGNS 145 (Autumn, 1980). 
2. 598 F. Supp. 1316 (S.D.Ind. 1984), aff'd, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd memo 
106 S.Ct. 1172 (1986). 
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of "sex discrimination", ·was struck down judicially as an uncon-
stitutional violation of the First Amendment's guarantee of free 
speech. During the same time period, the U.S. Attorney Gen-
eral's Commission on Pornography held hearings and ultimately 
released a report, declaring that pornography both is and causes 
criminal and violent behavior.4 
Since the decision in American Booksellers v. Hudnut, 
there has been no other major court test of the constitutionality 
of "anti-pornography" ordinances modelled on the Indianapolis 
design. Since the Meese Commission released its "anti-pornogra-
phy" report, Attorney General Meese has announced the e~tab­
lishment of a fed,eral Center for Obscenity Prosecution and a 
task force of Justice Department lawyers to aid in the prosecu-
tion of pornographers, including a lawyer in each U.S. Attorney's 
office in. the United States to specialize in pornography 
prosecutions. II 
It seems fair to say that the 1980s' "anti-pornography" 
drive to date has received conflicting signals for the possible suc-
cess of the legal dimensions of its effort to establish that "[peo-
ally explicit subordination of women, whether in pictures or in words, that also includes 
one or more of the following: (1) Women are presented as sexual objects who enjoy pain 
or humiliation; or (2) Women are presented as sexual objects who experience sexual 
pleasure in being raped; or (3) Women are presented as sexual objects tied up or cut up 
or mutilated or bruised or physically hurt, or as dismembered or truncated or frag-
mented or severed into body parts; or (4) Women are presented being penetrated by 
objects or animals; or (5) Women are presented in scenarios of degradation, injury, 
abasement, torture, shown as filthy or inferior, bleeding, bruised or hurt in a context that 
makes these conditions sexual; (6) Women are presented as sexual objects for domina-
tion, conquest, violation, exploitation, possession, or use, or through postures of servility 
or submission or display." Indianapolis Gen. Ordinance, at § 16-3(q)(1) - (6). "The ordi-
nance as passed in April 1984 defined 'sexually explicit' to mean actual or simulated 
intercourse ·or the uncovered exhibition of the genitals, buttocks or anus. An amendment 
in June 1984 deleted this provision, leaving the term undefined." American Booksellers 
v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 324. The ordinance also provided that pornography included the 
"use of men, children or transsexuals in the place of women in paragraphs (1) through 
(6) above ...• " ld. 
4. U.S. Attorney General's Commission on Pornography, Report (1986). 
5. 3 Jour. Sexual Liberty 1 (March 1987). "Further, new bills are being in drafted to 
increase prison terms, confiscate assets of pornographers, restrict erotic television pro-
grams, and dial-a-porn telephone calls. Meese claimed that there would be no censorship 
or interference with First Amendment freedoms. Subsequently, at a Philadelphia speech 
to the Junior Statesmen America, Meese found himself confronted with a student hold-
ing up a centerfold of Playboy and asking if it were pornographic. Meese, reportedly 
somewhat flustered, admitted that Playboy and Penthouse were not considered ob-
scene." I d. 
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pIe] don't actually have a right to use dispossessed and exploited 
people to have [pornography] ... so that [the user] can have 
sex."6. The mixed success of this drive, legally speaking, hope-
fully provides a break for closer and more deliberative examina-
tions of the "anti-pornography" campaign itself. This article 
takes this "break in the action" as an opportunity to review the 
wider legal, political and psychological consequences of the drive 
against "pornography". The concern of this article is that the 
"anti-pornography" campaign has serious and as-yet ill-consid-
ered implications for a broader category of communication, here 
termed "sexual speech". 
"Sexual speech" in this article refers to any communication 
in any medium about sexual matters. The premise of this article 
is that almost every kind of sexual speech should be more fully 
protected by the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of 
speech than the crafters of the "anti-pornography" ordinances 
would have it be, and that almost every kind of sexual speech 
should even enjoy greater legal protection that sexual speech 
currently has, under U.S. Supreme Court decisions including 
Miller v. California.? 
The author of this article observes that simultaneous with 
the passionate and complex outcry for restrictions on sexually 
explicit speech, in the "anti-pornography" campaigns, this na-
tion is experiencing a number of less organized, less well-re-
ported and still very vital struggles about sexual speech in other 
contexts, including controversies about the type, extent and 
methods of education about AIDS/ARC, contraception, abor-
tion, gay/lesbian/bisexual people, sex education for minors (par-
ticularly about child abuse, pregnancy, heterosexuality and the 
alternatives, teen sexuality) and the protection of new forms and 
voices in erotic literature. It appears that at the same time that 
some factions in this society are calling for new restrictions on 
6. Dworkin, A Conflict of Sexual Rights, M5, 38 (April 1985). 
7. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). Miller contains the current general standard for prohibition of 
"obscenity", which it holds to be unprotected by the First Amendment: "obscenity" is 
that work which (1) "'the average person, applying contemporary standards'" would 
find, taken as a whole, appeals to the "prurient interest", and (2) "depicts or describes in 
a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the specific state law, 
sexual conduct specifically defined by the specific state law [prohibiting it];" and (3) 
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"sexually explicit" speech, other factions (with considerable 
overlap in the interests implicated, where feminists are con-
cerned) are calling for renewed scrutiny as to existing restric-
tions on purportedly "obscene" speech. 
The author's perspective on these importantly simultaneous 
developments is that if there is to be an inclusive, healthy and 
sex-positive national educational effort as to sex roles, sexuality 
and sexual relationships, there must be a place for "pornogra-
phy"8 within the boundaries of both criminal and civil legality. 
The author is not deterred from this position by the feminist 
"anti-pornography" leaders' assertion that any defense of "por-
nography" is "male supremacy,"9 any more than she is dis-
suaded from her position that sexual speech must be generally 
protected, rather than attacked, by the accusation of right-wing , 
8. The author proposes that the definition of "pornography" in the Indianapolis or-
dinance is far too sweeping to isolate and identify clearly even those forms of sexist 
violence that the designers of the ordinance claim to be seeking to prevent. The defini-
tion appears to include any literature where a person (male, female or ambiguous) enjoys 
her/his own or another's pain in a sexual context. Indianapolis ordinance § 16-3(q)(1), 
(5), (6) see supra note 2. This section would make actionable any version of the classic 
picture of the female "dominatrix" in her black boots and chain belt, inflicting hard licks 
of her whip on a prostrate male's bare buttocks, whether the image were presented to 
arouse those who enjoy sexual intimidation of men, or to parody and criticize sado-mas-
ochists generally. The ordinance's definition also would appear to make actionable the 
Venus de Milo, any work that dwells so long or prQfoundly on breasts, clitorises or 
vaginas that it might be said to have reduced a woman or women (or men, children or 
transsexuals, for that matter, American Booksellers, 771 F.2d at 324 "into body parts"; 
this could include most underwear advertisements (§ 16-3(q)(3». The definition also ap-
pears to include as legally actionable "pornography" the books Ulysses and the Iliad, cf. 
American Booksellers v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 325. Any depiction of women (or men, for 
that matter) using dildos, vibrators, diaphragms, speculums or any other objects to "pen-
etrate" (the ordinance does not say what is "penetrated", but, presumably, the vaginal 
opening, anal opening and urethra are intended; if the mouth is included, a more com-
prehensive array of words and pictures are made unlawful). Illustrative of the ordi-
nance's lack of attention to pressing current sex-related issues is the fact that the ordi-
nance in its terms would not prohibit depiction of penetration by a penis, but would 
prohibit depiction of penetration by a penis covered by a condom (i.e. an "object"); thus, 
the ordinance permits illustrations of unsafe sex but makes actionable illustrations of 
one form of safe sex. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. See also infra note 17, for 
discussion of what constitutes "safe sex". The definition also contains a sort of catch-all 
section, rendering essentially any purportedly offensive sexual objectification unlawful. 
Section 16-3(q)(6) would appear to make legally actionable the vast bulk of television 
depictions of women, from advertisements to the depiction of women as objects of an 
array of dominating, conquering, violating, exploiting, possessive and utile acts. by men 
in sexual scenes from public television dramas to commercial daytime and evening 
"soaps". 
9. C. MacKinnon, Not A Moral Issue, 2 YALE L. & POLICY REV. 321 (Spring 1984). 
4
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"anti-pornography" leaders that those who defend "pornogra-
phy" are libidinous libertines. The author is confident that she 
is neither a male supremacist nor a libidinous libertine. 10 
10. In the interests of elevating both the personal and the scholarly ethics of this 
discussion of sexual speech, including "pornography", the author offers that it is vitally 
important that the parties to the discussion "come out" about those facets of themselves 
that are most germane to their legal/political positions. Ct. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW IV (Foundation Press 1978) ("For me, the morality of responsible scholar-
ship points not at all to the classic formula of supposedly value-free detachment and 
allegedly unbiased description. Instead such morality points to an avowal of the substan-
tive beliefs and commitments that necessarily inform any account of constitutional argu-
ments and conclusions .•. Therefore the reader will find this book taking explicit posi-
tions on the most troublesome problems in constitutional law.") The author of this 
'article wishes to take Professor Tribe's model of scholarly ethics a step farther, and to 
practice honesty not simply in the taking of "explicit positions" about law and legal 
policy, but in the taking of "explicit positions" about sex itself; this step is warranted by 
vigorous application of the oft-quoted tenet of feminism that "the personal is political". 
The author is an open lesbian, in a monogamous and committed relationship; she likes 
sex, and she loathes violence; she finds vibrators, winks, teddy bears, and kitty cats sexy; 
she feels disturbed by sadomasochism, in part because of childhood and adolescent phys-
ical, emotional and sexual abuse of which she is a recovering survivor, in therapy; she 
believes in the Bill of Rights as a wild but still-too-elitist experiment in which women, in 
and among other oppressed groups, are struggling for inclusion; she is generally optimis-
tic, as opposed to cynical, about legal process, even as she is very exasperated and dis-
gusted with the repression of people by law in this society. Most earnestly, the author 
points out that while many of those who are urging passage of "anti-pornography" mea-
sures purport to accept the idea that "the personal is political" and the related idea that 
law results from subjective judgments, these people do not "come out" sexually or per-
sonally, and do not identify themselves as to the experiences in their own lives that have 
influenced the development of their views and positions about sexual speech. The author 
seriously contends that the quality of discussion of these issues would be considerably 
enhanced if the persons seeking to restrict, prohibit or make legally actionable certain 
sexual beliefs, thoughts or practices felt some ethical obligation to reveal their own be-
liefs, thoughts and practices in the course of this dialogue. As feminist poet and philoso-
pher Adrienne Rich has written, "Heterosexuality as an institution has also drowned in 
silence the erotic feelings between women. I myself lived half a lifetime in the lie of that 
denial. That silence makes us all, to some degree, into liars . . . The possibilities that 
exist between two people . . . are • . • the most interesting things in life. The liar is 
someone who keeps losing sight of these possibilities." A. RICH, WOMEN AND HONOR: 
SOME NOTES ON LYING (5th printing, 1979). Lawyers and legal scholars, feigning objectiv-
ity and purporting to be neutral, almost universally do not say where they are coming 
from, in discussions about sex as in other subject matters. This "silence" is extremely 
hazardous, in that it enables people to be led astray by the dodges and disguises of 
legalese and "legal method". There is also the danger that those who urge a certain legal 
outcome will be enforcing a code upon others that they do not live up to in their own 
personal lives. In the case of Bowers v. Hardwick, No. 86-140 (October Term 1985), in a 
brief for amici curiae Lesbian Rights Project and other feminist/egalitarian organiza-
tions, this author argued that "[i]f the sexual activities engaged in by tens of millions of 
persons, including oral-genital and anal-genital contact between male-male, female-fe-
male and male-female partners, are representative of the sexual activities engaged in by 
police officers, judges. jurors, prosecutors and others involved in enforcing the Georgia 
law and like laws of other states [prohibiting those types of sexual contacts], then there 
5
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The author asserts and believes that the "anti-pornogra-
phy". sponsors' emphasis on transforming more sexual speech 
into a form of legal wrong is a treacherous one, particularly in an 
era where more sexual speech is needed for so many reasons 
(some of which reasons are explored at length in this article.) 
The numerous and vital reasons for greater use of free speech to 
communicate about sexual matters appear generally to have 
been igTIored or misunderstood in the righteous anger and politi-
cal momentum that characterize the "anti-pornography" drive. 
The author also believes and asserts and that the "raging 
public debate over pornography,"ll with its "particularly 
heated" enactments among feminists,12 should be understood 
and appreciated as precisely the type of generous, controversial 
activation and vitalization of expression that is protected by the 
First Amendment's guarantee of free speech. The "pornogra-
phy" debate of the 1980s illustrates the process and method of 
openness, vehement and deep disagreement and non-silencing of 
opposing expression that makes the guarantee of free speech it-
self so vital and central to the survival, enrichment and growth 
of life and ideas in a free and struggling-to-be-more-free society/ 
world. Ironically, it is this means of debate and communication 
known as "free speech", tolerating the most severe polarization 
of beliefs and the most open possible exchange of ideas, includ-
ing those most palpably antithetical to the majoritarian, the 
moralistic and the traditional, that would be sacrificed to the 
ends of the "anti-pornography" group, albeit in favor of its ex-
tremely important goal of ending sexist violence. The very speci-
ficity about sexual matters in the exchange of ideas, beliefs and 
feelings about "pornography" would not be protected by the 
First Amendment, it those pressing for "anti-pornography" ordi-
will be many occasions where a lawbreaker will arrest, prosecute, convict or sentence 
another lawbreaker for acts that s/he also has done." Brief of Mary Dunlap, Bowers, 
published in 4 N.Y. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 949, 965 (1986). Given the history of hypoc-
risy in law enforcement about sexual matters, there is an additional reason for those who 
propose new restrictions on sexual speech to "come out" about their own sexual exper-
iences and values before prescribing to others. "Self-righteousness as to one's definitions 
of sexual propriety is perhaps as deep-founded as the individual's sense of boundaries 
upon his/her privacy and identity." M. Dunlap, Toward Recognition of A Right To Be 
Sexual, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. RPTR. 245, 248-249 (Spring 1982). 
11. R. Bension, Pornography and The First Amendment: American Booksellers v. 
Hudnut, 9 HARVARD WOMEN'S L. J. 153, 154 (1986). 
12. [d. at 155. 
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nances were to have their way with the First Amendment's guar-
antee of freedom of speech. 
The "anti-pornography" activists claim that pornography 
silences women.13 In their zeal to end the "silencing" that they 
claim pornography both is, in and of itself,!" and causes to 
women, the incautious and cavalier approach of these activists 
to "free speech" threatens not only to silence women, and men, 
and the activists themselves, as well as any person in this society 
who is striving or needing to communicate about sexual matters 
in a more explicit way. 
If the debate about the "pornography" ordinance were re-
duced to some of its symbolic essence, the opponents of pornog-
raphy might be perceived as stating that (1) there is a war be-
tween women and men going on;. (2) pornography is not only 
symptomatic of that war, but is itself an act of war; (3) destroy-
ing pornography would constitute not only a means of reducing 
the symptoms of the war, but a victory in a major battle of that 
war; and, (4) if people must be silenced along the way, as a cost 
of the war between the sexes, then let it be men (or, more radi-
cally: because it is inevitable in a war that someone gets si-
lenced, it should be men in this war because they are wrong); 
13. MacKinnon, Not A Moral Issue, supra note 8, at 322 ("the enforced silence of 
women"), Id., at 326 ("Men, permitted to put words (and other things) ih women's 
mouths, create scenes in which women desperately want to be bound, battered, torture!i, 
humiliated, and killed ..• Women are there to be violated and possessed .... "); C. 
MacKinnon, Feminist Discourse, Moral Values, and the Law: A Conversation, 34 BUF-
FALO L. REV. 11, 28 (1985) ("If somebody has got their foot on your neck, what do you 
do? I don't think you negotiate. I don't think you compromise. I don't think you even 
address the foot on your neck in your own voice, such as it is, and attempt to persuade it 
to move off. You try to figure out how to get it up off of you so that you can, among 
other things, have something to say."). 
14. The "anti-pornography" ordinance defenders sought to argue in American 
Booksellers, 598 F.Supp at 1330, that "pornography" is not speech, but conduct, and 
thus that it is not protected by the First Amendment. The District Court, in rejecting 
that argument, stated that the contention that pornography is conduct, and thus is not 
entitled to First Amendment protection, was offered "one senses with a certain sleight of 
hand", given that the ordinance in its terms addresses "the sexually explicit subordina-
tion of women, graphically depicted, whether in pictures or in words . ... " Id. (empha-
sis in original). Even so, it is clear that the "anti-pornography" ordinance's drafters take 
the position that pornography constitutes a silencing of women in and of itself, whether 
or not it is proved to cause silencing of women outside and beyond the words and pic-
tures that compose it. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV. 
CIV. RTs. - CIV. Lm. L. REV. 1-21 (1985) ("[i]f a woman is subjected, why should it matter 
that the work has other value?"). 
7
Dunlap: Sexual Speech
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1987
366 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:359 
because "free speech" is part of a male establishmentarian legal 
system, there can be little lostllS by women if the "anti-pornogra-
phy" campaign imposes jeopardy to "free speech" as men have 
defined, used and enjoyed it. (The implicit final step in this 
chain, which may actually be the first step for some who accept 
the "anti-pornography" position, is that because men and 
women are at war with each other, sex with men or in any posi-
tion reminiscent of male/female intercourse is a defeat.I6) It is 
the author's essential position that each of these beguiling and 
provocative steps in the feminist "anti-pornography" chain reac-
tion contains both powerful truth and danger (in the potential of 
action based on the overstatement contained in each step), and 
that, ultimately, engagement in the chain reaction itself engulfs 
the possibilities that the truth in each step can be appreciated, 
isolated and built upon, without losing our developing senses of 
feminist and humanist priorities, and our legally evolving and 
constitutionally based progresses and possibilities, all to a reac-
tion to "pornography". 
II. CURRENT U.S. SOCIETY NEEDS MORE AND BETTER 
SEXUALLY EXPLICIT EXPRESSION, FOR NUMEROUS 
IMPORTANT REASONS. 
The need for "sexually explicit" expression, and for more 
and clearer communication about sexual matters, seems to mul-
tiply with everyday's revelations of new relationships, possibili-
ties between people, and phenomena. It is proposed that before 
any further restrictions on sexual speech are urged, the propo-
nents of such restrictions consider the following list of priorities 
of the feminist and human rights movements, and the concrete 
implications of restrictions upon "sexually explicit" expression 
upon each priority: 
1. The effort to give children better, more effective tools to com-
bat sexual abuse, including familial sexual abuse and incest; . 
15. "In the struggle against pornography, women have precious few strategies and 
very little to lose. . . while women struggle to keep our movement alive, our sisters are 
beaten, fore-fucked, prostituted, impoverished and enslaved. This ordinance may relieve 
some of that suffering and help us name it for what it is." Baldwin, The Sexuality of 
Inequality; The Minneapolis Pornography Ordinance, 2 LAW & INEQUALITY 629, 646 
(August 1984). 
16. See quotation of Carol Vance and discussion thereof, infra note 27 and accom-
panying text. 
8
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2. Enablement/empowerment of both minors and adults to know 
more about their own developing sexualities (including the pro's 
and con's of being gay, lesbian,17 bisexual, heterosexual, celibate 
or otherwise; the methods and effects of particular forms of con-
traception; pregnancy in and out of marriage; surrogate mother-
hood; venereal disease; abortion choice; AIDS/ARC causes, 
modes of prevention and treatment; rape and sexual assault; the 
sex industry (including prostitution, pornography, commerciali-
zation of sex); . 
3. Improvement of intimate relationships, by people learning to 
say what they do and do not like, want or need in the way of sex; 
4. Breaking down sex-stereotyping and sex-role stereotyping in 
all realms of life, in work, play, economics, sexual activity; 
5. Expanding the possibilities of aesthetic and artistic adventur-
ing about sex (viewing sexual activity as a frontier, in which fan-
tasy, imagination and art need to be free to develop, alongside 
"safe sex"lB and auto-erotic practices) and developing rich and 
satisfying sources of erotica (that is, non-violent and egalitarian 
sexual media); 
6. Working to overcome the dichotomization and polarization of 
"women" versus "ladies"19, and of sexually active women includ-
ing "promiscuous" women, prostitutes, single mothers and teen-
age females versus virtuous females, virgins, and monogamous, 
virtuous wives;20 
17. Among the lesbian literature that the Indianapolis ordinance would easily be 
invoked to make civilly actionable might be JoAnn Loulan's book, LESBIAN SEX (1983), 
which interviews a great number of lesbians and reports their sexual practices; that work, 
as well as the vituperative and voluble criticisms of it as "proheterosexual" and "anti-
political" in, for example, The Lesbian Inciter 6 (Dec. 1985), both contain discussions of 
women and dildoes, vibrators, men and other apparently actionable material, under the 
terms of the Indianapolis ordinance. See supra notes 3 & 7. 
18. The phrase "safe sex" has developed as something of a term of art in the AIDS/ 
ARC education and prevention process in the U.S. "Safe sex" excludes sexual practices 
that cause the exchange of bodily fluids (blood and semen, in particular) and, thus, that 
risk transmission of the AIDS virus. 
19. In San Francisco, a group called the Plutonium Players got their start doing 
skits and sketches as "Ladies Against Women", featuring the mottoes "Born to Clean" 
and "You can't join this group unless your husband consents", and recommending activi-
ties such as "consciousness-lowering sessions". The humor of this group partly derives 
from the idea that ladies don't need equality, and really can't afford it if they are to 
remain ladies, who are defined, after all, by contrast to that less desirable and proper 
species, women. Phyllis Schlafly, a famous opponent of the women's movement and of 
the Equal Rights Amendment in particular, has advanced this "Ladies Against Women" 
school of thought, for real, in a number of publications and speeches. P. Schlafly, The 
Power of The Positive Woman (Jove, 1978); P. Schlafly, New Guard 85 (1973). 
20. Actor Colleen Dewhurst testified at the Proceedings of the National Coalition 
9
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7. Elevating and enriching the level of public media about sexual 
activity (from the "dirty secrets" approach21 common in current 
media to something at once loftier and deeper) with attention to 
preserving fun as well as dignity and to respecting the need for 
privacy as well as public education in sexual matters; _ 
8. Getting the government out of the bedroom where the activi-
ties occurring there are both "victimless" and essentially pri-
vate22 while getting the government to act to prevent and rem-
edy forms of serious and damaging violence against women that 
have been historically legally neglected or insulated from legal 
scrutiny by assertions of male, paternal privilege and authority 
(e.g. marital rape; child abuse and incest; sexual harassment); 
9. Distinguishing between sex and violence.23 
Against Censorship that "[w]hen Moon for the Misbegotten [a play by Eugene O'Neill] 
opened in Detroit ... [the police closed it] 'for obscenity' ... [in that the play] men-
tioned 'mother' and 'postitute' in the same sentence." The Meese Commission Exposed 
7, 9 (NCAC, 1/16/87). It is this type of legal intervention, not by police but by civil 
litigants offended by "pornography", that the Indianapolis "anti-pornography" ordi-
nance legally would effectuate. 
21. A prime current example of this approach to sexual activity is the reporting of 
the "dirty secrets" of the deposed leaders of the PTL (Praise the Lord) Club, an evangel-
ical/television empire, Jim and Tammy Faye Bakker; he is reputed to have paid off a 20-
year-old woman in conjunction with extramarital sexual activity, and to have hired both 
male and female sexual partners, and she is accused of a love affair (at least of the heart 
and soul) with a country singer. The sexism of this saga is pretty blatant, too. See 
Mandel, It's Too, Too Easy To Laugh At Tammy, S.F. Chronicle B3 (4/30/87). 
22. See, e.g., brief amici curiae, Bowers, supra note 9; in Bowers, a bare majority of 
the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a Georgia law that prohibits all oral-genital and anal-
genital contacts, regardless of any other circumstances. 
23. "The word pornography covers a broad spectrum of sexual scripts and, certainly, 
some of these are violent, some show female humiliation, some indulge the idea that 
women like to be hurt. But pornography is above all about sex, about feelings that are 
fragile, often repressed, often a source of shame. Most people in this society were raised 
to fear sex, or feel guilty or embarrassed by it, so that when images of sex are mixed with 
images of violence, it is hard to separate out the sexual anxiety we feel from our repul-
sion to the violence. All the same, when a law against images is proposed, it's important 
to sort out these mixed feelings." L. Duggan & A. Snitow, Porn Law Is About Images, 
Not Power, NEWSDAY (9/26/84). Proponents of the ordinances foster confusion between 
sex and violence, and, it appears, seek to enrage and impassion their readers and listen-
ers, by mixing sex and violence in the examples they offer in support of their position. 
See, MacKinnon, Feminist Discourse, Moral Values and the Law A Discussion, supra 
note, at 28, 35, 73, ("The freedom we have is so small compared to the kind of freedom 
that we could have if we transformed this society, if we were able to get this foot off our 
necks," (tying rape to the anti-pornography argument); Baldwin, The Sexuality of Ine-
quality: The Minneapolis PornQgraphy Ordinance, supra note 14, at 632 ("Women es-
pecially love to be fucked by animals, dildoes, fists, and penises, especially when being 
bound, beaten, cut, mutilated and killed. . . . This is the version of sexual equality that 
is in the mouths of the pornographers who tell us they love women."; E. Spahn, On Sex 
and Violence, 20 New Eng.L.Rev. 629, 635-36 (1984-85) (Connecting violent rape, abduc-
10
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The above itemization of the bases for needing more, better 
and clearer expression about sexual matters is neither exhaus-
tive nor intended to be doctrinaire. Doubtlessly there are other 
important needs for more, better and clearer sexual speech that 
have been excluded. Moreover, feminists do disagree about these 
priorities, as well. Nevertheless, it remains true that each of the 
above listed items cuts against the approach of the "anti-por-
nography" ordinance, literally (in terms of a conflict between 
serving that priority and enforcing the ordinance), in policy 
terms, and in terms of constitutional and political development 
of "free speech". 
A few illustrations of the incompatibility of the "anti-por-
nography" ordinance with fulfillment of the fe~inist/humanist 
priorities listed above should suffice to underscore the failure of 
the "anti-pornography" ordinances to have been designed and 
adopted with attention to their broad consequences. The ab-
sence of care as to the implications of the ordinance for these 
other feminist/humanist causes; and for the need for more open 
sexual speech to fulfill them, is as plain as it is confounding. 
In California in 1986 and 1987, a significant legislative con-
flict ensued concerning the passage of "specific guidelines for 
teaching students [in public primary and secondary schools] 
about homosexuality, AIDS, contraception, abortion, and other 
sex-related issues."24 Opponents of the guidelines argued that 
the state was fostering homosexuality by taking neutral posi-
tions about it, and asserted that" 'the revised guidelines offer no 
tion and defecation and urination on victim with pornography). One powerful rhetorical 
mechanism of the "anti-pornography" proponents is to make as imperceptibly slight a 
distinction as possible between sex and violence, to gain support for ordinances that fail 
to distinguish sex and violence as well. In those instances where sex and violence are 
united in the examples themselves, there is no effort to point out that existing laws pro-
hibit the violence, whether occurring in or out of sexual contexts. The method is ex-
tremely effective, in that the rage one feels toward the raping, defecating, urinating, 
stabbing, shooting and violent attacker can be transferred to the pornography found in 
his possessions before the attack, and to the maker of the pornography who profited by 
"inspiring" him to commit these acts by writing of similar acts, and marketing the writ-
ing. Id. The rage thus transferred holds the pornographer and the producer of the por-
nography responsible. None of the "anti-pornography" opponents offers a good reason, 
however, for not keeping the rage focused upon the attacker, and/or upon the criminal 
justice system that failed to convict him, and/or the society that taught him - in an 
everyday way, with or without pornography -- that he could do these things to women 
and feel more powerful. 
24. Los Angeles Daily Journal 2 (3/12/87). 
11
Dunlap: Sexual Speech
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1987
370 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:359 
assurances that pornographic materials, in' the name of "safe 
sex" education, will not be used."2lS The State Board of Educa-
tion was deluged with letters taking sex-negative as well as spe-
cifically anti -gay /lesbian positions.26 
The Indianapolis "anti-pornography" ordinances, were it 
law in California, easily could be invoked to enable those oppos-
ing the sex education guidelines to bring civil suits against edu-
cators and school officials who, in following the guidelines, 
elected to provide, "in pictures or in words", information about 
sexual transmission of AIDS, or about particular "unsafe sex" 
practices (e.g. rimming, first-fucking, sharing sex toYS).27 More-
over, even if the precise terms of the ordinance could not be in-
voked to apply to the sex education materials of a particular 
(brave) teacher or (progressive) school district, the climate of re-
straint upon sexual speech promoted by the "anti-pornography" 
campaign would suffice to deter most educators from taking any 
such risks. 
The sex-negative and speech-suppressing message of the 
"anti-pornography" campaign is powerful, both in and beyond 
the terms of the ordinances themselves. As one feminist anthro-
pologist has observed: 
[T]his law winds up doing a very traditional 
cultural operation in condemning sexually explicit 
images and words. There are a number of familiar 
themes: that sex degrades women but not men; 
that men are raving beasts; that sex is dangerous 
for women; that sexuality is male and not female; 
that women are victims, not sexual agents; that 
25. [d. This argument was advanced by the Los Angeles County Commission on 
Obscenity and Pornography. 
26. Letter from Lobby for Individual Freedom and Equality (LIFE) to interested 
constituent persons and groups (1/16/87). 
27. These types of information readily could be interpreted to violate an "anti-por-
nography" ordinance worded as the Indianapolis ordinance was, with its sweeping and 
ambiguous wording. See n. supra. This litigative likelihood is enhanced where issues of 
gay!lesbian people are concerned, due to the commonness of hostile adversaries and/or 
judges, of which there appear to be a steady supply where gay rights causes are con-
cerned, see M. Dunlap & J. Gomez, First Amendment, § 9.03(e), R. Achtenberg, ed. SEX-
UAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW (Clark Boardman, 1985) ("Many judicial decisions as to 
lesbians and gay males betray, where they do not announce, a deep lack of respect for 
the people, value and cultures associated with lesbianism and gay male sexuality."). 
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men inflict sex on women; that penetration is 
equivalent to submission; and that heterosexual-
ity - and not the institution of heterosexuality - is 
sexist. What appeared novel is really the reap-
pearance of a very traditional concern that ex-
plicit sexuality itself constitutes the degradation 
of women.28 
371 
The philosophical atmosphere of the "anti-pornography" cam-
paign, to the extent that it conveys that sex is bad and should 
not be communicated about, certainly endangers the delicate 
work of those struggling for more openness and candor in sexual 
speech. 
A related harmful consequence of the "anti-pornography" 
campaign is its support, whether intentional or inadvertent, of 
those who seek to empower and keep the State in the I bedrooms 
of consenting adults, where sexual activity is concerned. In 1986, 
the U.S. Supreme Court dealt a severe blow to those seeking to 
limit the prerogatives of government to criminalize private, con-
senting sexual activity between adults, when it upheld a Georgia 
law that prohibits any oral-genital and any anal-genital sexual 
contact, regardless of circumstances, in the case of Bowers v. 
Hardwick.29 In their incautious definitions of what sexual speech 
is to be legally actionable, as well as in their dependence upon 
lines of legal precedent that empower government to intrude 
into private, consenting sexual activity, the "anti-pornography" 
proponents strengthen the Bowers v. Hardwick line of analysis. 
In common with the approach of Bowers, the "anti-pornogra-
phy" proponents would enable government to decide the bounds 
of sexual communication, and to act against those who cross the 
lines government chooses to draw. 
Another example of the real damage to the above-enumer-
ated feminist/humanist priorities that the "anti-pornography" 
ordinances achieve derives from the inadequacy and vagueness 
of the line between "pornography" and "erotica", not only in the 
28. C. Vance, cited in Benson, Pornography and The First Amendment: American 
Booksellers u. Hudnut, supra note 10, at 171 n.82. 
29. Bowers, No. 86-140, supra n.9. "Having approached the Bowers case with care, 
hope, and guarded optimism, it is difficult now to read the opinions of Justices White 
and Powell and Chief Justice Burger without concluding that these opinions represent 
unqualified disaster for lesbian and gay freedom and equality under law." M. Dunlap, 
Introduction to Brief of Mary Dunlap, Bowers, cited supra note 9, at 951. 
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ordinances but in their drafters' thinking. While the drafters of 
the ordinances propose that the ordinances "include everything 
tliat is pornography and do. . . not include anything that is not' 
and "do ... not include 'erotica,' which is sexually explicit sex 
promised on equality,"30 nothing in the ordinances in any way 
exempts or insulates "erotica". In fact, the inclusion or exclusion 
of "erotica" is left entirely to judicial interpretation of the often 
vague, loose phrases of the ordinances.31 
The range of feminist imagination and ex-
pression in the realm of sexuality has barely be-
gun to find voice. Women need the freedom and 
the socially recognized space to appropriate for 
themselves the robustness of what traditionally 
has been male language. Laws such as the one[s] 
under challenge here could constrict that freedom 
. . . as more women's writing and art on sexual 
themes (footnote omitted) emerges which is un-
ladylike, unfeminine, aggressive, power-charged, 
pushy, vulgar, urgent, confident and intense, the 
traditional foes of women's attempts to step out 
of their 'proper place' will find an effective tool of 
repression in the Indianapolis ordinance.32 
30. Bryden, Between Two Constitutions: Feminism and Pornography, 2 CONST. 
COMMENTARY 147, 171 (1985). 
31. See supra notes 3 and 7 and accompanying text; see also, American Booksellers 
v. Hudnut, 598 F.Supp. at 1337-38 ("[t]he Court is struck by the vagueness problems 
inherent in the definition of pornography, itself, more specifically, the term, "subordina-
tion of women". That term is not specifically defined in the Ordinance, and it is almost 
impossible to settle in ones own mind or experience upon a single meaning or under-
standing of that term . . . What constitutes subordination under this Ordinance is left 
finally to "the censorship committee or to individual plaintiffs who choose to bring actions 
to enforce [it] ... and under any due process standards, that is unfair in a fundamental 
and constitutional sense.") 
32. Brief Amici Curiae of the Feminist Anti-Censorship Task Force (FACT) et ale 
31-32, in American Booksellers V. Hudnut, No. 84-3147 (4/8/85). The author of this arti-
cle notes that she was an amicus who joined in that brief, along with, inter alia, Roberta 
Achtenberg, Directing Attorney of the Lesbian Rights Project, San Francisco; Jewelle 
Gomez, a critic for the Village Voice and other publications; Kate Millet, author of SEX-
UAL POLITICS, THE PROSTITUTION PAPERS, FLYING and SITA; Phyllis Lyon, co-author of 
LESBIAN/WOMAN; Del Martin, author of BATTERED WIVES; Adrienne Rich, a renowned 
lesbian feminist writer and poet; and dozens of others similarly involved. Id. at xii-xix. 
The Brief was authored by Nan Hunter and Sylvia Law of New York. The risk of the 
"anti-pornography" campaign for feminist imagination and sexual speech generally is 
deepened when the ordinances' proponents claim that pornography not only causes sex-
ual violence, but is, ill and of itself, sexual violence. Such an argument, if accepted, 
would have placed "pornography" on the "conduct" side of the speech/conduct line, in 
14
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In their terms, the ordinances give no protection whatsoever to 
"erotica", whether defined as the ordinance's drafters wish it to 
be or otherwise. Moreover, in the attitudes about sex that the 
ordinances are based upon, room for the development of sex-
positive literature of an erotic nature is exceedingly hard to find. 
III. EXISTING "OBSCENITY" DECISIONS THREATEN 
SEXUAL SPEECH GENERALLY, AND THE "ANTI-POR-
NOGRAPHY" ORDINANCES BUILD UPON THOSE 
DECISIONS. 
One of the primary drafters of the Indianapolis and Minne-
apolis "anti-pornography" ordinances, law professor Catherine 
MacKinnon, claims that the ordinances are not derived from or 
based in concern about the prevention of "obscenity". Says 
MacKinnon: 
"The law of obscenity (footnote omitted), the 
state's primary approach (footnote omitted) to its 
version of the pornography question, has literally 
nothing in common with this feminist critique [of 
pornography]. Their obscenity is not our pornog-
raphy . . . . obscenity law proposes to control 
what and how sex can be publicly shown."33 
MacKinnon then proceeds in this article, and elsewhere,34 vigor-
ously to' disown and disavow connection of her campaign with 
"obscenity" law. 
Yet in the litigation of American Booksellers v. Hudnut,ar. 
First Amendment terms, enabling government to prohibit it outright, without regard to 
First Amendment implications. But see supra note 13 and accompanying text. The in-
ability of the "anti-pornography" campaigners to differentiate between fantasy and real-
ity, and between speech and conduct, empowers those who would welcome the opportu-
nity to repress sexual speech in the name of preventing conduct. "Images of violence are 
not the same thing as violence itself; a picture of a rape is not a rape .•.. In fantasy, 
we test the boundaries of our feelings in ways that might terrify us in real life. The whole 
point on which discussions of fantasy and reality turn is that almost all of us know the 
difference." L. Duggan & A. Snitow, supra note 22 (emphasis in original) "Porn Law Is 
About Images, Not Power", Newsday (9/26/84). 
33. MacKinnon, Not A Moral Issue, supra note 8, at 329. C. MacKinnon, Feminist 
Discourse, Moral Values, and the Law A Conversation, supra note 1, at 34 ("[the ordi-
nance] ... does not empower the state in the direct way that an obscenity law does"). 
34. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
35. "The ordinance reaches 'sexually explicit activity' • . . The Supreme Court has 
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MacKinnon et al. invoked this self-same body of "obscenity" 
prohibition as a basis for constitutional construction of a pro-
posed exception of "pornography" from the guarantee of free 
speech.36 It is precisely the precedents of the Supreme Court 
that entitle government to act against "obscenity" that MacKin-
non and others defending the "anti-pornography" ordinance in 
Indianapolis depended upon, cited and sought to expand. The 
entire "anti-pornography" statutory approach was enabled and 
emboldened by case precedents that carved out an "obscenity" 
exception to the First Amendment's guarantee of "free speech". 
The political distinction that MacKinnon offered between 
obscenity and pornography dissolved completely in the legal ar-
gument in American Booksellers v. Hudnut. This is particularly 
important when one considers that the reason MacKinnon spon-
sored the distinction was to differentiate her position, and to 
disassociate her politics, from that of right-wing moralists. 
"Obscenity is a moral idea; pornography is a political prac-
tice. Obscenity is abstract; pornography is concrete. The two 
concepts represent two entirely different things. Nudity, explic-
itness, excess of candor, arousal or excitement, prurience, un-
naturalness - these qualities bother obscenity law when sex is 
depicted or portrayed."37 The above assertions were offered in 
defense of the idea that MacKinnon's position as a radical femi-
nist was not a "moral" issue, and was wholly different than that 
of governmental agents running around suppressing sexual 
speech because they disapproved of it. Yet in the litigation of 
American Booksellers v. Hudnut, the two positions merged to-
tally, in favor of the assertion that the "obscenity" exception to 
the First Amendment should be expanded to enable civilliabil-
ity for a far wider array of sexual speech than Miller v. Califor-
determined that 'there is . . . a less vital interest in the uninhibited exhibition of mate-
rial that is on the borderline between pornography and artistic expression than in the 
free dissemination of ideas of social and political significance . . . The message . . . is 
that it is constitutional for anyone who steps too close to the line to take the risk of 
crossing it when sexually explicit material is involved. The chilling effect is simply not 
entitled to great weight in this context." Brief of Appellants 53, American Booksellers u. 
Hudnut, No. 84-3147. "[Appellants in defending the ordinance] ... ask this Court to 
rule that all sexually explicit speech is disfavored, so as to trivalize the threat of sup-
pressing sexual speech which is currently protected by the Constitution ... " Brief 
Amici Curiae of FACT 27, supra note 31. 
36.Id. 
37. C. MacKinnon, "Not A Moral Issue" 323, supra note 8. 
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nia38 enables government to prohibit as "ohscene". 
Even without the expansion of the "obscenity" exception 
that MacKinnon and others actually litigated to establish in 
American Booksellers v. Hudnut, sexual speech that serves fem-
inist/humanist purposes is widely jeopardized by loose and iU-
defined exceptions to the First Amendment's protection of free 
speech. A recent example of this real jeopardy is the charge of 
"obscenity" by the Federal Communications Commission leveled 
against the Pacifica Foundation, at the behest of an Orange 
County preacher, for airing of a "safe sex" radio program enti-
·tled "Jerker", which contained "sexually explicit" language.39 
A perhaps subtler and just-as-harmful example of the dan-
ger of poorly defined exceptions to the guarantee of free speech, 
of the sort urged by appellants in American Booksellers v. Hud-
nut, emerges from an employment discrimination case about a 
bisexual public employee. That case, Rowland v. Mad River 
School District,4° resulted in a federal appellate court's determi-
38. See supra, note 6 and accompanying text. 
39. Coming Up 8 (San Francisco, May 1987). "For good measure, the preacher also 
complained about KPFK's practice of giving calendar listings for a gay chapter of the 
ACLU." [d. 
40. Rowland v. Mad River School District, 730 F.2d 444, 449 (6th Cir. 1984), (citing 
Connick v. Myers appears to have established a "personal speech" exception to the First 
Amendment's guarantee that threatens to engulf much "personal is political" speech 
about sexual matters and otherwise, see supra note 9, by the inclination to trivialize such 
matters. Connick and Rowland also both involve speech by women. The "anti-pornogra-
phy" ordinance sponsors' position feeds into and supports this very trivialization of 
women's speech, at least about sexual matters, by arguments such as those made in the 
American Booksellers case that sexual speech is of "low value" in the U.S. constitutional 
scheme of things, and thus is not worthy of protection. In American Booksellers, the 
Court of Appeals resoundingly rejected this characterization of sexual speech, stating in 
relevant part: "We come, finally, to the argument that pornography is 'low value' speech, 
that it is enough like obscenity that Indianapolis may prohibit it. Some cases hold that 
speech far removed from politics and other subjects at the core of the Framers' concerns 
may be subjected to special regulation. e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Foundation. 438 U.S. 726, 
(1978); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 67-70; __ S.Ct. 2440, 2450-
52, 49 L.Ed.2d 310 (1976) (plurality opinion); Chaplinsky v. New· Hampshire, 315 U.S. 
568, 571-72, 62 S.Ct. 766, (1942). These cases do not sustain statutes that select among 
viewpoints, however . . . At all events, 'pornography' is not low value speech within the 
meaning of these cases. Indianapolis seeks to prohibit certain speech because it believes 
this speech influences social relations and politics on a grand scale, that it controls atti-
tudes at home and in the legislature. This precludes a characterization of the speech as 
low value." 771 F.2d at 331. It is noted that the appellants in American Booksellers 
sought to extend the "low value" idea from obscenity to pornography by contending that 
both have sex in common. This very conceptual bridge from obscenity to pornography, 
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nation that a bisexual school guidance counselor's "coming out" 
to other staff in the school constituted non-protected speech, 
outside the First Amendment's protection, because her identifi-
cation of herself as bisexual was speech "only in her personal 
interest . . . [on a matter not of] public concern. . . when she 
began speaking to others about her own sexual preference."4! 
The boundaries of this "personal speech" exception to the guar-
antee of free speech seem dangerously close to non-existent, 
where the silencing of unpopular speech about sexual matters 
(such as bisexuality) is concerned. 
Rowland aptly illustrates the severe hazard to feminist pri-
orities, not to mention to equal justice under law, of haphazard 
and expedient engrafting of exceptions upon the First Amend-
ment for speech that is considered oppressive and offensive. In 
terms of the risk of the "obscenity" exception, no less a cham-
pion of both free speech42 and equal protection without regard 
to sex43 than Justice William O. Douglas had occasion to 
observe: 
If 'obscenity' can be carved out of the First 
Amendment, what other like exceptions can be 
created? Is 'sacrilege' also beyond the pale? Are 
utterances or publications made with 'malice' un-
protected? How about 'seditious' speech or arti-
cles? False, scandalous, and malicious writings or 
utterances against the Congress or the President 
'with intent to defame' or bring them 'the hatred 
of the good people' or 'to stir up sedition', or to 
'excite' people to 'resist, oppose, and defeat' any 
which MacKinnon and others deny using in condemning pornography but which they 
obviously used in defending the ordinance, see supra notes 32-38 and accompanying 
text, would invite those seeking to broadly prohibit sexual speech to cross over from 
obscenity to pornography, and beyond, without any regard for what is being trammeled 
in terms of interests in sexual speech. It is this real-life disregard for the relationships of 
ideas, and this bliteful ignorance about the carcinogenic quality of loose exceptions to 
free speech, see e.g., discussion of Rowland v. Mad River School District and Connick v. 
Myers, supra, that spells disaster for all of the positive, feminist values served by sexual 
speech, if law is permitted to incorporate the "anti-pornography" chain reaction. See 
text at note 15, supra. 
41. ld. 
42. See THE DOUGLAS OPINIONS 170-230 (V. Countryman, ed.,) (Random House 
1977). 
43. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, (1973) (joining in plurality opin-
ion that sex should be a suspect category for equal protection purposes). 
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law were once made a crime [under the Alien and 
Sedition Acts of 1798]. Now that the First 
Amendment applies to the States . . . may the 
States embark on such totalitarian controls over 
thought or over the press? May Congress do SO?44 
377 
The concern that Justice Douglas articulated about the cre-
ation of exceptions to free speech certainly has as much applica-
tion in an era of debate, dispute and cultural trouble about sex-
ual politics as it has to the genres of traditional political and 
economic speech among cloistered elitist males for which free 
speech may have originally been intended. 
At least one state supreme court recently recognized the es-
sential danger of the "obscenity" exception to the First Amend-
ment's guarantee, in striking down its own criminal obscenity 
law. The Oregon Supreme Court, in Oregon v. Henry,45, held 
that its law making it a crime to make, exhibit, sell, deliver or 
provide any obscene medium violated its own state constitution, 
holding that the "obscenity" exception to the U.S. Constitution 
did not empower the state legislature to suppress speech; the 
Court observed that "[t]he problem with the U.S. Supreme 
Court's approach to obscene expression is that it permits the 
government to decide what constitutes socially acceptable 
expression. "46 
Perhaps the most dramatic illustration of "anti-pornogra-
phy" anti-logic lies in its proponents' apparent willingness to 
create an exception to First Amendment free speech that em-
bodies so much confusion about the value of sexual speech and 
that is so ill-deliberated in general, that it enables the suppres-
sion of the proponents' own expression about sex. Are the "anti-
pornography" advocates not precisely prototypical of those dan-
gerous women, engaged in unprotected "personal speech" about 
sexual matters, that those whom they accuse of silencing women 
for profit and power would gladly find to be engaged in expres-
44. Byrne v. Karalexis, 396 U.S. 976, (1969) (dissenting) (in appeal from injunction 
permitting owner and operator of a motion picture theatre to be free of further prosecu-
tion pending resolution of the question whether the film, [ am Curious (Yellow), was 
obscene under Massachusetts law.). 
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sion that is "obscene", "pornographic" or anything else prereq-
uisite to silencing them? 
Of course, one would expect that the proponents would seek 
to defend their own communication by limiting their definition 
of "pornography" to a particular intent on the part of the com-
municator, and on the part of the recipient of the communica-
tion. After all, it is the smarmy porno profiteer and the equally 
smutty purchaser at whom the Indianapolis law is aimed, so a 
group of feminist debaters about sex should not be the targets of 
civil action, under the proponents' theory. The problem with 
this theory is that there is not any limitation in the ordinance, 
nor in its proponents' willingness to relegate sexual speech to a 
low order in First Amendment terms, such that right-wing mor-
alists, claiming that discussions and depictions of pornography 
by feminists (not to mention famous feminist books such as Our 
Bodies, Ourselves and Lesbian Sex) are degrading and subordi-
native to women, to use the State to silence the entire feminist 
discussion. The "anti-pornography" proponents, with their 
genderized dichotomization of law and sexual speech as inher-
ently male and of victims as ineluctably female, have missed a 
crucial point -- free speech about sex is exactly what they are 
relying upon to conduct their side of this fascinating, difficult 
and probably unending debate. The exception for sexual speech 
of "low value" that they contend for today, in hopes of silencing 
"pornography", will be invoked to silence their "low value" and 
"offensive" speech tomorrow. This author, for one, hopes that 
the exception that they seek never becomes law; if it does, she 
expects her own free speech to be demonstrably and tragically 
diminished. 
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